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Often, deviations of ﬁrm behavior from proﬁt maximization are
the result of managerial incentive contracts. We study the endoge-
nous emergence of incentive contracts used by ﬁrm owners to delegate
the strategic decisions of the ﬁrm. These contracts are linear com-
binations either of own ﬁrm’s proﬁts and revenues, or own and rival
ﬁrms’ proﬁts. A two- and three-stage game are studied depending on
whether owners commit or not to a certain contract type before set-
ting the managerial incentives and the level of output to produce in
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1the market. We report experimental results which conﬁrm some of the
predictions of the model, especially those concerning owners’ prefer-
ence for relative performance incentives over proﬁt-revenue contracts.
Neglected behavioral aspects are proposed as possible explanation of
some divergence between the theory and the experimental evidence,
more speciﬁcally the relation between contract terms and managers’
output choices
JEL: D43, L21
Keywords: Experimental economics; Oligopoly theory; Manage-
rial delegation; Endogenous contracts.
21 Introduction
Neoclassical economics consider ﬁrms as economic agents whose main objec-
tive is to maximize proﬁts. However seminal papers such as Baumol’s (1958)
suggested a sales-maximization model of ﬁrms’ objective function as a realis-
tic alternative to the proﬁt-maximization one. More recently, Fershtman and
Judd (1987) argued that a proper analysis of the ﬁrm’s objective function
should be undertaken under the prism of separation between ownership and
management.1 They further argued that such an analysis should incorpo-
rate the structure of the incentives that owners oﬀer to managers in order to
motivate them.
The strategic use of managerial incentive contracts has been introduced in
the Industrial Organization literature by Vickers (1985), Fershtman (1985),
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987). In this line of research,
each owner has the opportunity to delegate market competition decision and
oﬀer an incentive contract to his manager in order to direct him to a more
aggressive behavior in the market, so as to force the competing manager
to reduce output. When determining his manager’s incentives each owner
has an opportunity to obtain competitive advantage via delegation, provided
that rival owners do not delegate any decisions to managers. Typically, in
equilibrium, all owners act in the same way, engaging in a prisoners’ dilemma.
In this context, the choice of contract terms determines whether the man-
ager’s reward will depend more on the ﬁrm’s proﬁts or some other alternative
objective like for example the ﬁrm’s sales. Incentive schemes which are com-
binations of proﬁt and revenue have been extensively studied. On the con-
trary, other types of incentive contracts which reward the manager according
to diﬀerent objectives like relative performance in the market have received
much less attention. Miller and Pazgal (2001, 2002, 2005) formalize the idea
that each manager may be concerned with the competing ﬁrms’ performance
when making his decision, under the ‘Relative Performance’ type of dele-
1Managerial theories of the ﬁrm and agency theory have emphasized that the afore-
mentioned separation leads to ineﬃciencies due to asymmetric information and diﬀering
objectives of managers and owners (e.g., Williamson, 1964; Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Fama and Jensen, 1983).
3gation schemes. The equilibrium outcome of the aforementioned model is
similar to the one obtained under the one that includes a linear combination
of proﬁts and sales delegation schemes.
In this paper, we present and experimentally test an oligopoly delegation
model in which ﬁrms’ owners choose between incentive contracts which re-
ward managers according to combinations of proﬁt and revenue or proﬁta n d
relative performance. In fact, in the presence of these two alternative incen-
tive schemes, ﬁrms’ owners decisions concern both the objectives that should
be pursued by their managers as well as on the mixture of these objectives in
the manager’s ﬁnal reward. Our theoretical results predict that owners will
induce their managers the objective of maximizing their ﬁrm’s performance
relative to other ﬁrms.
To our knowledge, Huck et al. (2004) is the only previous experimen-
tal study on delegation of objectives in oligopoly. However, in their frame-
work, the choice of ﬁrm owners is limited to the terms of an exogenously
imposed proﬁt-revenue incentive scheme. Therefore, ours is the ﬁrst exper-
iment allowing subjects to choose between two diﬀerent incentive contract
types independently and before the actual terms of the contract are chosen.
Furthermore, contrary to the discrete strategy space used by these authors
to implement a reduced form of the underlying game, we have used a ﬁner
grid for both output choices and contract term parameters.
Compared with Huck et al. (2004), our ﬁndings are far more supportive
for the main theoretical prediction concerning the use of objectives other than
mere proﬁt maximization. Generally speaking, some of our model’s predic-
tions receive strong support by our experiments, while others receive much
weaker support or are even rejected. First, the prevalence of the Relative
Performance contract type over the Proﬁt Revenue alternative is strongly
conﬁrmed. However, we are able to disentangle the two motives oﬀered by
the theoretical study for such prevalence. The explanation based on the
selection of focal, Pareto superior points receives clear support against the
alternative of strategic commitment on contract types before the terms of
the incentives are ﬁxed. Second, the predicted higher aggressiveness under
Relative Performance incentives is observed only in asymmetric conﬁgura-
4tions involving co-existence of both types of contracts. Third, contrary to
the theoretical predictions, output is not responsive either to contract type,
or to contract terms.
The above experimental results indicate that the theoretical literature
on strategic delegation in oligopoly may have ignored some important issues
that matter in this context. The most prominent among the issues ignored
in the aforementioned theoretical models seems to be fairness. Given that
owners and managers are assumed to be absolute own utility maximizers, the
latter are expected to accept any reward above their reservation salary no
matter how unfair the split of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts may be. However, since the
seminal ultimatum experiment by Güth et al. (1982), we know that an agent
receiving an unequal proposal of sharing a given proﬁtw i t ha n o t h e ra g e n t
may prefer earning nothing than earning an unfairly low amount of money.
Later, an inﬂuential strand of literature emerged on economic behavior which
is driven by other motives than pure short-run own utility maximization.2
Furthermore, in a principal-agent relationship, agents may have preferences
on the competitiveness of the incentive scheme according to which they will
be compensated. For example, it would be plausible to suspect that hyper-
competitive incentive schemes may be negatively perceived by agents. This
phenomenon has never been studied so far in the context of strategic dele-
gation in oligopoly. This task is partially undertaken here, and this makes
our study interesting for researchers working on the design of incentives and
delegation of diﬀerent levels of decision making within collective decision
making entities like ﬁrms which then compete with other entities of a similar
structure.
The paper is organized in the following way: Section II discusses the the-
oretical framework and presents the testable hypotheses. Section III presents
the experimental design. Section IV reports the results and section V con-
2A sample of representative contributions from a plethora of recent papers is Andreoni
(1988, 1990), Andreoni and Croson (2008), Berg et al. (1995), Camerer and Thaler (1995),
Charness (2004), Cochard et al. (2004), Croson (2000), Dufwenberg et al. (2001), Dufwen-
berg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Fehr and Gächter (1998), Fehr et al. (1998a,b), Fehr and
Schmidt (1999), Gächter and Falk (2002), Gneezy et al. (2000), Güth et al. (1997, 2001),
Hoﬀman et al. (1994, 1996), Levine (1998), McCabe et al. (2000, 2003), McCabe and
Smith (2000) and Rabin (1993).
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2 The theoretical framework
We consider a homogenous good industry where two ﬁrms, denoted by i,j =
1,2,i6= j, compete in quantities. The (inverse) demand function for the
ﬁnal good is given by P (Q)=a − Q,w h e r eQ = q1 + q2 is the aggregate
output, with {i,j} = {1,2}, i 6= j, A>0.T h u s ,ﬁrm i’s proﬁts are given by:
Πi =( A − qi − qj − c)qi (1)
In this industry, each ﬁr mh a sa no w n e ra n dam a n a g e r .F o l l o w i n gF e r -
shtman and Judd (1987), when we say owner, we mean a decision maker
whose objective is to maximize the proﬁts of the ﬁrm. This could be the
actual owner, a board of directors, or a chief executive oﬃcer. Managers are
agents hired by owners to make real time operating decisions. Each owner can
choose one among two diﬀerent types of incentive contracts to compensate
his manager: the ﬁrst is the Proﬁt-Revenue (PR) type of contract. Following
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), under this type of contract,
the incentive structure takes a particular form: each risk-neutral manager i
is paid at the margin, in proportion to a linear combination of own proﬁts






i Πi +( 1− a
PR
i )Ri (2)
where Πi and Ri are ﬁrm i’s proﬁts and revenues respectively and aPR
i is the
managerial incentive parameter that is chosen by owner i. From a theoretical
point of view, since the manager’s reward is linear in proﬁts and sales, he
is paid Ai + BiUPR
i for some constants Ai, Bi,w i t hBi > 0.S i n c e h e i s
risk-neutral, he acts so as to maximize UPR
i and the values of Ai and Bi
are irrelevant. If aPR
i < 1, ﬁrm i’s manager should move away from strict
proﬁt-maximization towards higher sales, thus, becoming a more aggressive
seller in the market.
The second type of contract is the Relative Performance (RP) one. Fol-
6lowing Miller and Pazgal (2001; 2002; 2005), under this contract, each owner
i compensates his manager putting a weight of (1−aRP
i ) on own proﬁts and
aw e i g h to faRP
i on the diﬀerence between own proﬁts and the proﬁts of the





i Πi +( 1− a
RP
i )[Πi − Πj] (3)
When the objective function is written in this manner, it becomes ap-
parent that if aRP
i < 1, manager i puts negative weight on rival ﬁrm’s per-
formance. If aRP
i =1the manager’s behavior coincides with standard own
proﬁt-maximization.
In order to examine which types of managerial incentive contracts prevail
in equilibrium, we consider a two-stage game with the following timing: in
the ﬁrst stage, each owner chooses the type of contract to reward his manager
and sets the corresponding managerial incentive parameter ai.I nc o n t r a s tt o
the received literature, our postulate is that there is no ex-ante commitment
o v e rt h et y p eo fc o n t r a c tt h a te a c ho w n e rw i l lo ﬀer to his manager. The
crucial, yet (due to the symmetric industry) reasonable assumption here is
that the precise contract (the type of contract and the managerial incentive
parameter) that owner i sets is not observable by the rival owner, before
contract-setting is everywhere completed. Thus, we argue that each owner
can independently shift from a Proﬁt-Revenue (Relative Performance) con-
tract, to a Relative Performance (Proﬁt-Revenue) one. In the second stage
of the game, given that the type of contract and the incentive parameter that
each owner has chosen have become common knowledge and cannot be reset,
managers compete setting quantities. An alternative assumption concerning
the timing of the game and, thus, the strategic role of committing to a con-
tract type is considered, according to which contract types are decided and
observed before the terms of incentive contracts are chosen. This leads to a
three stage game in which the choice of contract type precedes the choice of
contract terms, with output decided in the third stage.
Subgame perfection is used as the equilibrium concept to solve these
games by backward induction.
7First, the Universal Proﬁt-Revenue scenario is investigated, in which both
ﬁrms’ owners choose a Proﬁt-Revenue contract to compensate their man-


















Second, the Universal Relative-Performance is examined. The corresponding

















Finally the Coexistence of the two types of contract is considered, in which,
without loss of generality owner i is assumed to choose a Proﬁt-Revenue con-
tract, while his rival’s choice is a Relative Performance one. The equilibrium
outcome of the Coexistence scenario is given by:
a
(pr−rp)∗
























We next summarize the main ﬁndings given in eq.(4), (5), (6) and (7),
which yield the hypotheses which will be tested with our experimental de-
sign.3
First regarding the endogenous choice of managerial contracts, when own-
ers commit to a contract before choosing the terms, a dominant strategy of
both ﬁrms is to reward their managers under a Relative Performance type of
contract. In the absence of commitment on contract type before the terms
of incentive contracts are chosen, multiple equilibria exist corresponding to
the universal adoption of either contract type. However, the Pareto criterion
could be used to select the Relative Performance type as a focal equilibrium
point. In terms of observable implications, this would lead to the following
3Formal proofs and results obtained in this framework are presented and discussed in
detail in Manasakis et al. (2007).
8testable hypothesis:
TESTABLE HYPOTHESIS 1: (H1.1) Relative Performance incen-
tives will be preferred over Proﬁt-Revenue incentive schemes and (H1.2) if
the focal point motivation for the prevalence of Relative Performance incen-
tives dominates over the strategic commitment alternative, the frequency
of Relative Performance incentives will increase if ﬁrms commit to an incen-
tive contract type before deciding on the terms of the contract.
Given each one of these two equilibrium points, the terms of the corre-
sponding equilibrium incentives should be such that Relative Performance-
rewarding owners choose their managers’ objectives closer to proﬁtm a x i -
mization, while in the alternative Proﬁt-Revenue equilibrium managers are
asked to deviate more from pure proﬁt-seeking behavior.
TESTABLE HYPOTHESIS 2: The terms of incentives under univer-
sal adoption of each type of contract are such that managers under Relative
Performance contracts are induced to adopt a less aggressive behavior than
under Proﬁt-Revenue incentives. In asymmetric conﬁgurations the reverse
ranking is expected to be observed.
Regarding the consequences of this prediction for the corresponding equi-
librium outputs, it is shown that Proﬁt-Revenue contracts lead to a higher
individual and total output than Relative Performance contracts, which also
explains why the universal Relative Performance equilibrium is more prof-
itable than its Proﬁt-Revenue counterpart. Contrary to this comparison of
equilibrium outputs across the two symmetric contract choices, in asymmet-
ric contract conﬁgurations the ﬁrm using Relative Performance incentives
produces higher output than its Proﬁt-Revenue-oriented rival.
This can be summarized in the following testable hypothesis:
TESTABLE HYPOTHESIS 3: Compared to the case of universal
Relative Performance contracts, output is higher under industry-wide adop-
tion of Proﬁt-Revenue incentives, while the contrary ranking of individual
outputs is predicted within a duopoly in which the two contract types coexist.
It is worth noting that if both ﬁrms chose no delegation at all they would
e n du pe a r n i n gh i g h e rp r o ﬁts than in any of the delegation scenarios discussed
above. The reason for the emergence of symmetric delegation equilibria is
9straightforward: by using an incentive contract strategically, an owner directs
his manager to a more aggressive behavior in order to force the competing
manager to reduce output. Because owners act in identical ways at the
contract stage of the game, ﬁrms end up in a prisoners’ dilemma situation.
Naturally, the increase of market supply, in comparison to the no-delegation
case, leads to lower proﬁts and higher levels of social welfare.
The intuition behind the prevalence of the Relative Performance equi-
librium is based on the results observed in eq.(??). More speciﬁcally, the
owner who selects Relative Performance type of contract for his manager,
obtains competitive advantage in the market, for any contract choice of the
rival ﬁrm. This makes the selection of a Relative Performance managerial
contract each owner’s best response to whatever the rival owner’s choice is.
Hence, Relative Performance is the dominant owners’ strategy.
3 Experimental design
We have tested the predictions of the theoretical framework outlined above
in a laboratory experiment.
A total of 144 subjects participated in the sessions. They were volunteers
recruited among 2nd and 3rd course students enrolled in the Business and
Human Resources degrees at the Universitat Jaume I according to standard
protocols used in the Laboratori d’Economia Experimental (LEE) of the Uni-
versitat Jaume I (Castellón, Spain), where all the sessions reported here, were
run. Real monetary incentives were used. Each session lasted approximately
100 minutes and average earnings per subject were slightly below 20 Euros.
The experiment was organized under two treatments. A total of four 36-
subject sessions were run, two under each treatment. In the ﬁrst treatment,
labeled as 2-stage game, owners choose simultaneously the type and the terms
of their managers’ incentive contracts before managers decide on their ﬁrms’
output. In the second treatment, labeled as 3-stage, the choice of contract
type precedes the choice of contract terms and the corresponding decisions
become public information before the contract terms are chosen by the owners
and quantities are set by managers. The experiment was programmed using
10the z-Tree toolbox (Fischbacher, 1999). At the beginning of the session, each
subject was randomly assigned the role of an owner or a manager and written
instructions speciﬁc to each role were distributed to them. All remaining
questions were privately answered by one of the organizers.
Eighteen owner-manager pairs were randomly formed once at the begin-
ning of each session. These intra-ﬁrm pairs were kept ﬁxed throughout the 50
periods of the session in order to encourage the development of a cooperative
relation between the agents who formed each ﬁrm. Nine pairs of ﬁrms were
randomly formed in each period using a strangers matching protocol in or-
der to preserve the one-shot nature of the market game. In order to increase
the number of completely independent observations per session, matching
occurred within three groups of 6 owner-manager pairs (ﬁrms), that is three
independent matching groups of 12 subjects each. However, this precise de-
tail was not known by the subjects who would have a further diﬃculty to
guess the total group size and assess the likelihood of being re-matched with
the same ﬁrm in two diﬀerent periods, given that the computer network of
the LEE is installed in two distant rooms between which there is no possi-
bility of visual contact. No signiﬁcant diﬀerence was found across matching
groups within each treatment and, thus, data from the same treatment were
pooled together. Following this design a total of three totally independent
observations per session is guaranteed by the fact that strategies and the
history experienced by each subject were never contaminated nor did they
contaminate decision making within the other two matching groups. There-
fore, in a very strict statistical sense, our conclusions are based on behavior
within six totally independent groups per treatment.
Four independent sessions were run in two occasions on subsequent dates
(18-19/12/2006 and 29-30/05/2007). The order between 2-stage and 3-stage
treatment sessions was changed across the two occasions to control for any
undesirable "social learning" across sessions creating misleading false treat-
ment eﬀects. Therefore, sessions 1 and 4 correspond to the 3-stage treatment,
while sessions 2 and 3 belong to the 2-stage treatment.
The total cost for subject rewards was 2,739 euros which implies slightly
above 19 euros per subject earnings, ranging between 7.3 and 29.6 euros
11(an owner subject in a three stage session and an owner-subject in a 2-stage
session respectively). Subjects in the 2-stage treatment receive slightly higher
payments than in the 3-stage one (19.3 and 18.7 euros respectively).
Given the experience from pilot sessions, the payment method was de-
signed to yield similar earnings across player types.4 Thus an equal split
of the experimental earnings was observed in the overall sample and within
each treatment.5
The model’s parameter values implemented here are: A =1 0 0 0 , γ =1
(homogeneous product) and c =2 0 0 . To compensate for possible negative
earnings, a show-up fee of 10 euros was given to each subject and it was
uniformly distributed over the 50 periods in the form of a ﬁxed amount
f =2 0 ,000ExCus (Experimental Currency Units) per period. Therefore,
an exchange rate of 1 euro per 80,000 ExCus was used.
Under this set of parameters the prediction for a non delegation Cournot
equilibrium output is qCournot
i =2 6 6 .66. Given the prediction of the model
concerning the contract choice stage, we move to the contract terms and
outputs corresponding to the two aforementioned perfect equilibria. In the
Universal Proﬁt-Revenue equilibrium, both ﬁrms should choose aPR∗
i =1 /5
and managers should set the corresponding equilibrium output levels at
qPR∗
i =3 2 0 . In the Universal Relative Performance equilibrium, both ﬁrms’
owners set aRP∗
i =2 /3, leading to the corresponding equilibrium output level
qRP∗
i = 300. Although the combination of ﬁrm i c h o o s i n gaP r o ﬁt-Revenue
contract while j chooses Relative Performance incentives is not an equilib-
rium, it is worth mentioning that the corresponding equilibrium contract




j )=( 1 ,0,200,400).
A strict test of the theoretical model should aim at comparing the ob-
served data on contract types, contract terms and outputs to the aforemen-
tioned theoretical predictions. However, any experimentalist would immedi-
ately recognize the diﬃculties associated with such a strict test of the theory,
4See instructions to the subject on this issue.
5That is owners’ earnings were exactly 50% of total earnings in both the overall sample
and the subsamples under treatments 1 and 2. Small variations of these percentages were
observed across sessions (51% in session 1; 52% in session 2; 47% in session 3 and 48% in
session 4.
12given that, unlike the usual theoretical assumption of perfectly informed hu-
man decision makers with unlimited calculus capacity and perfect foresight,
real subjects learn from trial-and-error strategies and often commit system-
atic mistakes due to a number of reasons.6 Thus, we will focus on the test
of the predictions provided in a qualitative form by the testable hypotheses
H1-H3 stated in the previous section.
4R e s u l t s
Data analysis reveals two interesting results regarding the type of the con-
tract that owners will choose for their managers. First, ﬁrms’ owners will
only rarely choose not to delegate any decisions to their managers.7 This is in
line with the theoretical prediction (See, Vickers (1985), Fershtman (1985),
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987)), according to which owners
will always choose strategic delegation in order to obtain competitive advan-
tage in the market. Moreover this contradicts the experimental ﬁndings of
Huck et al. (2004), according to which ﬁrms’ owners’ choice will in most
cases be "No Delegation".
6A vast literature has been dedicated to various factors that may be responsible for
observed shortcomings of human behavior in complex environments, such as misperception
of feedback (Paich and Sterman, 1993 and Sterman 1994), limitations in subjects’ learn-
ing when exposed to strategic complexity (Richards and Hays 1998), or multitask decision
making (Kelly 1995). A number of factors that favor subjects’ improvement of performance
have, also, been identiﬁed. For example, trial-and-error algorithms have been shown to
facilitate convergence of the strategies played by uninformed subjects toward symmetric,
full-information equilibrium predictions, as shown in Garcia-Gallego (1998) for the case of
a price-setting oligopoly. While full convergence near the theoretical single-product sym-
metric benchmark is obtained in settings such as that outlined in Garcia-Gallego (1998),
the introduction of a slightly more complex task in the multiproduct oligopolies in Garcia-
Gallego and Georgantzis (2001) or the asymmetry in Garcia-Gallego et al. (2004) provide
as u ﬃciently unfavorable environment for the hypothesis based on the corresponding the-
oretical prediction to be rejected.
7Only 6%(4%) of the contracts include No Delegation in the 2-Stage (3-stage) treat-
ment.
13Treatment 2-Stage 3-Stage  Both 









Quantity  357.00  97.99 354.43 91.97 355.72 95.02 
Incentive Parameter (a)  .498  .261 .523 .285 .510 .274 
Type of contract  1.733  .442 1.709 .454 1.721 .448 
Profits  30802.09  19598.56 32213.03 19387.36 31507.56  19503.3 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (overall sample). Proﬁt-Revenue
Contracts=1, Relative Performance Contracts=2.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on individual quantities, contract
types and incentive parameter choices. From this information we can see that
quantities have been, on average, signiﬁcantly higher than expected, even if
we compared the average output obtained (approximately, 355 in the overall
sample, 357 in the 2-stage game and 354 in the 3-stage one, with the most
expansive theoretical output prediction (320 product units) corresponding
to the simultaneous adoption of Proﬁt-Revenue contracts by both owners.
In fact, under our parameters, the other two scenarios (Universal Relative
Performance and coexistence of both contract types) yield the same average
output prediction (300 product units, although asymmetric contract conﬁg-
urations predict 400 for the Relative Performance-rewarding ﬁrm versus its
Proﬁt-Revenue oriented rival). Therefore, our subjects have behaved in an
excessively pro-competitive way, far beyond the consequences predicted by
the theoretical model for any of the scenarios studied. Given that the pre-
dictions of the model concerning the contract terms signiﬁcantly vary across
diﬀerent scenarios, we will study the behavior of subjects with respect to the
contract parameter choice contingent to each speciﬁcs c e n a r i o . H o w e v e r ,a
ﬁrst look at the overall sample reveals some not necessarily innocuous at-
traction to the focal value of 0.5, which lies between the predictions of both
the two symmetric equilibrium conﬁgurations (1/5 and 2/3) and the predic-
14tions of the asymmetric contract conﬁguration (0 and 1). As we said, we
will discuss this in more detail in tables presenting contract term decisions
contingent to diﬀerent contract conﬁgurations. However, the attraction to
“moderate” values of the parameter suggests that the deviation of the ob-
served contract terms from their corresponding theoretical values towards
more central attractors, such as the value of 0.5 which must be given special
attention.8
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Table 2: Means, (standard deviations) of a and [frequencies of contract
types] for both the 2-stage and 3-stage treatments.
Let us move now to Table 2. Relative Performance contracts are more
frequently used than Proﬁt Revenue incentives under both treatments.9 But
what we are really interested to see is weather the combination of con-
tract choices is as predicted by the subgame perfect equilibria discussed
above. As sown in Table 3, in the 3-stage treatment, more than half of
8See, for example, Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (2002) where subjects oﬀered a
continuum of lotteries with winning probabilities ranging between 0 and 1 are found to
have some non Expected Utility-compatible preference for probabilities near 0.5.
9480 vs. 1320 times in the 2-stage treatment and 523 vs.1277 times in the 3-stage
treatment.
15our experimental duopolies have taken place under universal Relative Per-
formance incentive contracts (932/1800 = 51.7%). Contrary to this equilib-
rium, the Universal Proﬁt-Revenue equilibrium receives scarce, if any, sup-
port (178/1800 = 9.8%) of all contract combinations observed.
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Table 3: Means, (st.deviations) of a and [frequencies of contract types] for
the 3-stage treatment.
In fact the frequency of Universal Proﬁt Revenue contracts is approxi-
mately half the frequency of "out of equilibrium" coexistence of the two
contract types in the same market.10 This ﬁnding conﬁrms the theoretical
prediction according to which owners will reward managers under a Rela-
tive Performance type of contract. However, while this is a clear conﬁrma-
tion of our Testable Hypothesis 1 according to which Relative Performance
contracts will be chosen more frequently due to the Pareto selection crite-
rion as a focal equilibrium point, we ﬁnd no evidence in favor of the second
10A χ2 test (p =0 .0001) has been used to conﬁrm the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerence
between the aforementioned observed frequencies and a random distribution of strategy
pairs uniformly across the corresponding outcomes of the game in the contract stage.
16part of the hypothesis (H2) concerning an increased likelihood of Relative
Performance contracts in the 3-stage game. Speciﬁcally, against the afore-
mentioned prediction, Table 1 indicates that the frequency of contract 2 is
slightly higher (not signiﬁcantly, though) in the 2-stage than in the 3-stage
treatment. Therefore, we can state the following important ﬁnding:
RESULT 1: Relative Performance contracts are signiﬁcantly more fre-
quent than Proﬁt-Revenue ones (H1.1), but (opposite to H1.2) the result does
not depend on whether owners commit on contract types before the contract
terms are chosen.
This result indicates that the selection criterion proposed in the theoreti-
cal ﬁndings in Manasakis et al. (2007) is more powerful than the 2-stage vs.
3-stage approach in explaining the prevalence of the Universal Relative Per-
formance equilibrium over its Proﬁt-Revenue counterpart. In other words,
the strategic importance of committing on a speciﬁcc o n t r a c tt y p el o o s e s
ground against a rational selection of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
Let us now present our ﬁndings regarding the managerial incentive pa-
rameter, α, for both contract types. First, under Proﬁt-Revenue contracts,
higher α’s are chosen by owners than those chosen under Relative Perfor-
mance incentives11 indicating that under such an incentive scheme, owners’
intentions to commit to a less competitive behavior is also expressed by the
choice of a higher α, favoring behavior which is closer to standard proﬁt
maximization. However, the only prediction of the theoretical model which
is supported by the observed contract terms is that, in asymmetric con-
ﬁgurations, Proﬁt-Revenue rewarding owners set higher α’s than Relative
Performance rewarding ﬁrms. On the contrary, symmetric conﬁgurations
are such that owners rewarding their managers’ Relative Performance set
lower α’s than owners in symmetric Proﬁt Revenue reward conﬁgurations.
Finally, taking into account the quantitative predictions under the set of the
parameters implemented in the experiment (1/5 and 2/3 for Proﬁt-Revenue
and Relative Performance, respectively), we observe that owners have exhib-
ited less aggressive behavior in symmetric conﬁgurations, setting on average
11Yielding an average of 0.57 vs. 0.47 in the 2-stage treatment and 0.61 vs. 0.48 in the
3-stage treatment.
17higher α’s than predicted in the corresponding subgame perfect equilibria,
while in the asymmetric case, less extreme α’s have been adopted (0.61 and
0.48, respectively) than the predicted values (1 for Proﬁt Revenue and 0 for
Relative Performance contracts). The most striking pattern observed in our
data on contract terms is that even after observing the other ﬁrm’s contract
type, owners set on average almost the same α independently of whether the
other ﬁrm has committed to one or the other contract type. That is, the
contract terms chosen by owners exhibit no diﬀerences in response to their
rivals commitment on a given incentive scheme. We summarize this in the
following result:
RESULT 2: 1. The prediction of the model concerning a higher aggres-
siveness of Relative Performance-rewarding owners over their Proﬁt-Revenue
rivals is conﬁrmed (partial conﬁrmation of H2). On the contrary, the pre-
diction concerning the ranking of α’s across symmetric conﬁgurations is not
supported by our data. 2. There is a systematic deviation of observed α’s
from the corresponding theoretical values (upwards for both symmetric conﬁg-
urations and Relative-Performance incentives in asymmetric situations and
downwards for Proﬁt Revenue in the asymmetric case). 3. Observing a ri-
val’s commitment on a given contract type does not aﬀect the average a’s
used by either Relative Performance, or Proﬁt Revenue rewarding owners.
Finally we focus on the eﬀects of contract type and incentive parameters
(α’s) on market outcomes. It is worth mentioning once more that output
behavior has been excessively expansive far beyond any of our theoretical
model’s predictions. Several other theoretical predictions concerning output
levels are partially or totally rejected. For example, the theoretical predic-
tion of higher output under Proﬁt-Revenue (Relative Performance) than in
symmetric (asymmetric) conﬁgurations, is not veriﬁed by the experimental
results. In fact, looking at Table 4 we can see that output has exhibited little
if any responsiveness to variations in the contract structure, given that the
only perceivable (though not statistically signiﬁcant) diﬀerence is between the
output averages of Relative Performance and Proﬁt Revenue oriented man-
agers. It has been already reported in the past that, contrary to Bertrand
competition, learning in Cournot experimental markets exhibits modest de-
18grees of convergence towards the corresponding theoretical predictions due
to excessively competitive behavior and strategy volatility.12 Our ﬁndings
here extend this lack of predictive power of the Cournot model over to multi-
stage games and speciﬁcally to the lack of output responsiveness to diﬀerent
delegation contracts.
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Table 4: Mean and standard deviation of ﬁrms’ quantity per contract type.
What is left is left now is to examine whether the terms of delegation
contracts have produced the expected outcome on output. That is, whether
a manager has responded in the expected way to his reward scheme. A simple
test is to see if there is a negative relation between the α parameter and the
output chosen. This can be done by examining speciﬁc patterns of individual
manager’s responses to their owner’s contract term decisions. This can only
be traced by looking at individual level data, and may be responsible for
some apparent lack of response of outputs to delegation contract terms.
Below in table 5, we present the patterns of output responses to contract
terms by contract conﬁguration. Monotonic (M) responses are deﬁned as
those which imply a monotonic response, in the predicted direction of the
a v e r a g eo u t p u tp e rm a r k e tw i t hr e s p e c tt oi n c r e a s e si nt h ec o n t r a c tt e r m
parameter. All other responses involving changes in the direction of the re-
12See, for example, the sharp diﬀerence in the results obtained by Garcia-Gallego (1998)
on learning in Bertrand oligopolies and those reported by Huck et al. (1999) on learning
in experimental Cournot markets.
19port or even persistence of a response direction opposite to that predicted
b yt h em o d e la r ed e ﬁned as non monotonic (N) changes. We observe that
t h em o s tf r e q u e n tp a t t e r n ,b yf a r ,i sN ,w h i c hi m p l i e st h a ti nm o s tm a r k e t s
average output has exhibited at least one kink, revealing non linear patterns
of individual managers’ response to their owners behavior. That is, in each
manager’s history we identify that there is a threshold value of the contract
term parameter beyond which the manager "counteracts" to the owner’s pre-
tended "advice" of an over-competitive behavior through extreme deviations
from plain proﬁt maximization.
Hence, the following result holds
RESULT 3: 1. Output is not monotonically responsive (in the pre-
dicted direction) to the delegation contract type. 2. Moreover, output is not
monotonically responsive (in the predicted direction) to contract terms.
This ﬁnding is based on individual market data with at least one incon-
sistent tendency of output responses, paying special attention to this phe-





Coexistence of both contract types scenario 
2-stage  3-stage 2-stage 3-stage 2-stage  3-stage 
                PR RP PR  RP 
M N M  N M N M  N M N M N M  N  M  N 
1 8 1  8 2 7 3  6 1 8 2 7 2  7  0  9 
 
Table 5: Number of markets (over 9) of patterns of average output response
to contract terms. M="Monotonic" (as predicted by the theory); N="Non
monotonic".
In most cases in which a non-monotonic pattern is observed, the latter
is associated with extreme values of alpha like are those inducing complete
deviation from plain proﬁt maximization. In order to interpret this result,
we must remember that manager subjects have no power to reply to their
20owners once the latter have chosen a contract term parameter. That is, man-
agers cannot renegotiate their contract, nor can they reject a given delegation
scheme. Furthermore, they cannot express their opinion or preferences re-
garding the contract terms they are oﬀered. In that sense, we must see
our results in line with a more general set of ﬁndings from economic ex-
periments on asymmetric bargaining situations like for example ultimatum
games. There, it is usually found that subjects, rather than simply max-
imizing own earnings their behavior is aﬀected by fairness considerations
w h i c hc a nb ee x p l a i n e da st h er e s u l to fother-regarding preferences. As a
result, weaker agents tend to reject unfair oﬀers, despite the fact that this
leads them to lower (usually zero) payoﬀs.13 This seems to be the case here,
with managers receiving an overcompetitive contract leading often to a war
with the other ﬁrm’s manager aiming at winning the race of who is going
to produce more. Managers engaged in such a warfare realize that the only
negative signal they can send to their ﬁrm’s owner concerning the imposi-
tion of such a contract is by producing an unproﬁtable output. Of course,
this reduces their own proﬁts too, but the message is clear: "I do not like
overcompetitive incentive contracts". Such a loss of utility from excessively
competitive environments has been reported in many diﬀerent contexts, but,
to our knowledge this is the ﬁrst time it is being reported in the context of
oligopoly delegation.
An alternative way to accommodate this ﬁn d i n gi n t ot h eo t h e r - r e g a r d i n g
preferences framework is by considering managers’ compliance with their
owners’ preferred objectives as reciprocal behavior14 aiming at rewarding
them for choosing a contract which does not put excessive pro-competitive
pressure on them when deciding their output decisions. In any case, a seri-
13See work on similar issues in diﬀerent contexts by Camerer and Thaler (1995), Croson
(1996) and, especially Fehr et al. (1998a), Gneezy et al. (2000) and the inﬂuential work
by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Rabin (1993).
14An extensive literature exists on positive and negative reciprocity in many diﬀerent
contexts. Without pretending an exhaustive list, some representative examples are studies
by Andreoni (1988 and 1990), Berg et al. (1995), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Boyd and
Richerson (1989), Cochard et al. (2004), Dufwenberg et al. (2001), Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004), Engelmann and Fischbacher (2002), Fehr and Gächter (1998), Fehr
et al. (1998b), Gächter and Falk (2002), Güth et al. (2001), McCabe et al. (2003). More
similar to our intraﬁrm relations context is the study by Charness (2004).
21ous but not surprising deviation of experimental results from the theoretical
framework is the little if any incidence of symmetric strategy proﬁles (in
contracts, contract terms, and output choices) which contrasts with the the-
oretical predictions of total symmetry. Therefore, one should have in mind
that, for example, in all the occasions of a Universal Relative Performance
conﬁguration there is a subject which receives a penalization (negative vari-
able compensation contingent on relative proﬁts) that might trigger regret
and feelings of loss to the looser of the output race. These considerations
suggest several natural extensions of this work in the future. On one hand, a
theoretical model with more behavioral consideration might be helpful in or-
der to bring the theoretical framework closer to real world markets. Second,
controlling for some of the behavioral factors described above could require
designing a more complex environment, accounting for manager’s willingness
to sacriﬁce present earnings in order to cause their ﬁrms’ owners to adopt
more manager-friendly contracts. We will undertake this task in the future.
5 Conclusions
One of the most prominent theoretical paradigms predicting rational devi-
ations from proﬁt maximization is oligopoly models with delegation of ﬁrm
objectives through managerial incentive contracts. So far, the experimental
literature on strategic delegation is limited to a context of owners choos-
ing the terms of an exogenously imposed proﬁt-revenue incentive scheme.15
Therefore, our experiment is, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst to allow subjects
to choose between two diﬀerent incentive contract types independently and
before the actual terms of the contract are chosen. Furthermore, contrary to
the discrete strategy space used in the aforementioned experimental study,
we have used a ﬁner grid in both the output choice stage and the preceding
one in which the contract terms are chosen.
We restrict our attention to three main testable hypotheses. The ﬁrst
regards the type of contracts that owners will endogenously choose to com-
15Huck et al. (2004).
22pensate their managers. The second refers to the relation between the con-
tract type and the degree of aggressiveness chosen by owners. Finally the
correlation of the contract type and managerial incentives to the market
outcomes. Our main ﬁnding is that Relative Performance contracts are sig-
niﬁcantly more frequent than Proﬁt-Revenue ones, but the result does not
depend on whether owners commit on contract types before the contract
terms are chosen. Thus the Pareto selection criterion is suﬃcient to explain
the prevalence of Relative Performance incentives, while the role of strategic
commitment on a contract type before the terms of the contract are cho-
sen adds nothing to the reasons why owners prefer this type of incentive.
Secondly, the prediction of the model concerning a higher aggressiveness of
Relative Performance-rewarding owners over their Proﬁt - R e v e n u er i v a l si s
conﬁrmed for asymmetric contract conﬁgurations only. On the contrary, the
prediction concerning the ranking of α’s across symmetric conﬁgurations is
not supported by our data. Additionally there is a systematic deviation of
observed α’s from the corresponding theoretical values (upwards for both
symmetric conﬁgurations and Relative-Performance incentives in asymmet-
ric situations and downwards for Proﬁt Revenue in the asymmetric case).
Furthermore, observing one’s rival’s commitment on a given contract type
does not aﬀect the average α used by either Relative Performance-rewarding
owners, or Proﬁt-Revenue ones. Finally, output is not monotonically respon-
sive in the expected direction neither to the delegation contract type, nor
to the contract terms which determine owners’ choise for their manager’s
aggressiveness during the market competition stage.
A possible explanation of these deviations from the predicted theoreti-
cal outcomes may be the fact that managers often counteract to excessively
pro-competitive incentive schemes as a means of punishing their owners for
using them. In this way, the resulting loss of present earnings aims at in-
creasing the probability of receiving more manager-friendly incentives in the
future, in the same way in which rejections in an ultimatum game aim at
increasing oﬀers in the future. This is certainly an underinvestigated behav-
ioral aspect of managerial incentives. Hopefully, this is the starting point
for a re-consideration of oligopoly delegation towards frameworks inspired
23on the rapidly growing behavioral economics literature on other-regarding
preferences.
6 Appendix: Experimental instructions (trans-
lated from Spanish)
6.1 Owner Instructions (2-stage treatment)
Your decisions in this experiment will help us study human behavior in spe-
ciﬁc economic contexts. The experiment is ﬁnanced by public research funds.
Read these instructions carefully, taking into account that a better under-
standing of the decision making context will help you earn more money and
generate more reliable and, thus, useful data.
You are the owner of one of the two ﬁrms selling a given product. You
will delegate the output decision of your ﬁrm to a manager whom you have
hired for this purpose.
You will have to decide on the reward method which your ﬁrm will adopt
to remunerate your ﬁrm’s manager. Your decisions in each period will become
public information to all agents involved in the same market before output
decisions are made. Managers will have to take these decisions as given and
then ﬁxt h e i rﬁrm’s output. Contracts may be of the following types:
Contract Type 1: 20.000 experimental monetary units (UMEX) as a ﬁxed
salary plus half of a linear combination between the ﬁrm’s proﬁts and the
ﬁrm’s revenues.
Choosing the value of alpha you can vary the weight given by your ﬁrm to
each of these two objectives (proﬁt and revenue) in the variable compensation
of the ﬁrm’s manager.
Contract Type 2: 20.000 experimental monetary units (UMEX) as a ﬁxed
salary plus half of a linear combination between the ﬁrm’s proﬁts and the
diﬀerence between your ﬁrm’s and the rival’s proﬁts.
Choosing the value of alpha you can vary the weight given by your ﬁrm to
each of these two objectives (proﬁt and revenue) in the variable compensation
24of the ﬁrm’s manager.
When choosing the contract terms you should take into account that your
earnings will be: a ﬁxed amount of 20.000 UMEX plus the ﬁrm’s proﬁtm i n u s
your manager’s variable earnings.
The market will take place for 50 subsequent periods. In each one of
them, following your choice of contract and that of the rival ﬁrm’s owner
managers will make output decisions simultaneously choosing output levels
ranging between 0 and 500 product units. You may change your manager’s
reward method every 3 periods during the ﬁrst 30 periods and every period
after period 30.
The manager of your ﬁrm will be randomly assigned to you once and
will be kept ﬁxed throughout the experiment. In each period, you will form
am a r k e tw i t ha( d i ﬀerent) single rival ﬁrm which will be chosen randomly
among the ﬁrms formed by the participants of this experiment in the same
way as your ﬁrm.
Y o u ro b j e c t i v ei st om a x i m i z ey o u rc u m u l a t i v ec o m p e n s a t i o n .T h em o r e
UMEX you earn the higher will your payment in cash at the end of the
session. We give you a ﬁxed initial payment of 100.000 UMEX which will be
added to your earnings from the experiment. The exchange rate is 1 euro for
every 80,000 UMEX.
[Only for the 3-stage treatment: You and the owner of the rival ﬁrm
will ﬁrst know the contract chosen by each one of you and then you will
decide on the value of alpha. Only after these two decisions have been made
by owners, the managers receive information on contract types and alpha’s
chosen in order to make their ﬁrms output decisions.]
Thank you for your participation and remember that, once these instruc-
tions are read, any communication or action which is not controlled by the
organizers is prohibited until payments in cash have been made at the end
of the experiment.
256.2 Manager Instructions (both treatments)
Your decisions in this experiment will help us study human behavior in spe-
ciﬁc economic contexts. The experiment is ﬁnanced by public research funds.
Read these instructions carefully, taking into account that a better under-
standing of the decision making context will help you earn more money and
generate more reliable and, thus, useful data.
You are the manager of one of the two ﬁrms selling a product in the
market. The owner of the ﬁrm has hired you in order to delegate to you the
decisions concerning the output of the ﬁrm.
T h em e t h o dw i t hw h i c hy o uw i l lb er e w a r d e dw h i c hy o uw i l lh a v et ot a k e
as given may be of either type:
Contract Type 1: 20.000 experimental currency units (UMEX) as a ﬁxed
salary plus a half of a linear combination between the proﬁts and the revenues
of the ﬁrm.
By choosing the value of alpha, the owner can vary the weight given to
each one of the two aforementioned objectives in the variable part of your
reward.
Contract Type 2: 20.000 experimental currency units (UMEX) as a ﬁxed
salary plus a half of a linear combination between the ﬁrm’s proﬁts and the
diﬀerence between the ﬁrm’s proﬁts and the proﬁts of the rival ﬁrm.
By choosing the value of alpha, the owner can vary the weight given to
each one of the two aforementioned objectives in the variable part of your
reward.
When receiving this information you should have in mind that the owner’s
earnings will be a ﬁxed amount of 20.000 UMEX plus the ﬁrm’s proﬁt, minus
the variable part of the owner’s reward.
The market will take place during 50 periods in each one of which you
will have to make the decision of your ﬁrm’s output. The contract concerning
your reward may be changed every three periods during the ﬁrst 30 periods
and every period after period 30.
You will be assigned to a ﬁrm’s owner who will be randomly chosen once
at the beginning of the experiment. This matching will be kept constant
26throughout the session. The ﬁrm with which your ﬁrm will be matched to
form a market will be determined randomly in each period among the rest of
the ﬁrms formed by the participants in this session in the same way as your
ﬁrm.
Y o u ro b j e c t i v ei st om a x i m i z ey o u rc u m u l a t i v ec o m p e n s a t i o n .T h em o r e
UMEX you earn the higher will your payment in cash at the end of the
session. We give you a ﬁxed initial payment of 100.000 UMEX which will be
added to your earnings from the experiment. The exchange rate is 1 euro for
every 80,000 UMEX.
Thank you for your participation and remember that, once these instruc-
tions are read, any communication or action which is not controlled by the
organizers is prohibited until payments in cash have been made at the end
of the experiment.
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